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Abstract
The United States and its allies continue to achieve significant military
victories against ISIS (otherwise known as ISIL or the “Islamic State”).
The loss of territories resulting from military victories is especially
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss4/2
important given that ISIS relies in part on recruits from the territories it
controls. Efforts have also been directed at killing the group’s core
leadership; stemming the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria
through tightening up border security and surveillance; and targeting
militant jihadi narratives and propaganda that is pushed out by ISIS on a
twenty-four/seven basis via the Internet and social media platforms. In
such a complicated security landscape, a new discourse on ISIS is
born—its allure, threat, grandeur, lawlessness, and violence have
emerged as the “new normal” in Syria and Iraq, and recently have spilled
out to Western Europe and beyond in home grown and ISIS directed
attacks. While cognizant of the progress achieved in the fight against
ISIS, this article, in particular, highlights the dangers emanating from
the group’s continuing online, as well as face-to-face, recruiting success
in the West and the apparent stagnation in the fight for dominance in the
digital battlefield where ISIS is currently winning.




Significant military victories against The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIS) and the Islamic State have been achieved to date.  Since 2014, 
estimates are the group has lost approximately 45 percent of its territory in 
Iraq and 10 percent in Syria.1  Military campaigns continue to diminish the 
group’s ability to exercise full control over large swaths of territories in Iraq 
and Syria and its membership base in general, as well as its ability to finance 
itself through the sale of oil, antiquities, slaves, and through taxing and 
extorting monetary payments from its civilian population.  Pentagon sources 
have also reported a decline in the number of foreign fighters going to Iraq 
and Syria from 2,000 to 500, and perhaps dropping as low as 200 a month.2  
 
The battle is also being fought through a combination of hard and soft power 
measures.  Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, Islamic State’s spokesperson—and 
according to some sources also responsible for plotting and directing the 
recent terrorist attacks in Brussels, Istanbul, and Paris—was recently killed in 
Aleppo, also sending a significant blow to Islamic State’s core leadership.3  
Omar al-Shishani, a top Islamic State commander and a veteran of the 
Chechen jihadi war, was also recently killed.4  These were two battle-
hardened and charismatic leaders suddenly removed from ISIS through 
airstrikes.  Efforts have also been directed at reducing the flow of foreign 
fighters to Iraq and Syria, with beginning efforts at targeting ISIS narratives 
and propaganda on the Internet and social media. Efforts are also being made 
to exploit rivalries and feuds between ISIS and competing groups on the 
ground to delegitimize and diminish the appeal of militant jihad to volunteers 
                                                          
1 Krystal Chia and Lin Xeuling, “ISIS is Targeting Southeast Asia amid Declining Mideast 
Support: Terror Expert,” The Soufan Group, August 4, 2016, available at: 
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-report-cited-on-channel-newsasia-isis-is-targeting-
southeast-asia-amid-declining-mideast-support-terror-expert/. 
2 “Are Airstrikes Successfully Weakening ISIS?” PBS NewsHours, May 1, 2016, available 
at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/are-airstrikes-successfully-weakening-isis/. 
3 Tim Lister, “Death of Senior Leader al-Adnani Caps Bad Month for ISIS,” CNN, 
September 1, 2016, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/30/world/isis-setbacks-
adnani-death/; Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla,” ISIS’ No 2 is Dead: What It Means 
to The West,” The Hill, September 6, 2016, available at: 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/294523-isis-number-two-is-
dead-what-it-means-to-the-west. 
4 Will Worley, “ISIS Confirms Death of Hugely Popular ‘Minister of War’ Omar al-
Shishani,” Independent, July 13, 2016, available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-confirms-death-of-
hugely-popular-minister-of-war-omar-al-shishani-a7135446.html. 
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and foreign fighters, including through the lens and stories of those who have 
defected or disengaged from the group.5   
 
Discussion 
Despite progress, ISIS remains a formidable force with a military presence in 
Iraq and Syria, including struggling affiliates in Libya, West Africa, Egypt, 
Lebanon, and Yemen.6  ISIS maintains a solid contingent of foreign fighters 
still under its control who pose both a terrorism threat to the West and a 
serious risk to the regional stability in the Middle East.  It also maintains an 
impressive social media presence that resonates with many militant jihadi 
wannabe volunteers worldwide, in particular homegrown terrorists who ISIS 
sometimes directs and other times only inspires.  
 
The United States (U.S.) counterparts, particularly in Europe, continue to 
struggle with border enforcement.  While Turkey has often ignored the 
streams of foreign fighters moving across its borders into Syria to join ISIS, 
Greece found itself overwhelmed with its porous borders and lack of 
cooperation with Turkey in stemming the flow of illegal immigrants.7  
Difficulties for Turkey’s security services also arise from their inability to 
distinguish foreign fighters from innocent holiday goers who booked resort 
packages in Turkey, but who instead of vacationing, enter ISIS from Turkey 
for short training sessions to be sent quickly back home for attacks launched 
sometime in the future.8  
 
It is also difficult to track individuals who have left and returned from the 
battlefield in Iraq and Syria, much less gather enough evidence to prosecute.  
From a legal standpoint, prosecuting them is difficult as it places a 
requirement on the state to prove that travels to Syria or Iraq entailed 
                                                          
5 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist 
Caliphate (McLean, VA: Advances Press, LLC, 2016), 332; Anne Speckhard, “The Best 
Weapon to Defeat ISIS: US testimonials from Disillusioned Recruits Who’ve Defected 
Against Them,” New York Daily News, July 6, 2016, available at: 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/anne-speckhard-best-weapon-defeat-isis-
article-1.2700282. 
6 Nicole Gaouette, “US Adds ISIS in Yemen, Libya, Saudi to Terror List,” CNN, May 19, 
2016, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/19/politics/isis-yemen-libya-saudi-
arabia-us-designation-terrorist/. 
7 Ahmet S. Yayla, “Deadly Interactions,” World Policy Journal 32:4 (2015): 83-91. doi: 
10.1177/0740277515623751. 
8 Rukmini Callimachi, “How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers,” 
The New York Times, August 3, 2016, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-recruit-
interview.html?_r=0. 




engagement in terrorism or that a suspect returned to commit a terrorist act.9  
Interviews with law enforcement officials in the Balkans, specifically in 
Kosovo, revealed the issue of how some ISIS cadres are declaring themselves 
killed on social media and then cross borders illegally to return home, living 
without papers under the radar of government and security services.  Despite 
the European members’ commitment to strengthen efforts against the 
potential foreign fighter threat, barriers in the areas of information and 
intelligence sharing, mainly due to data privacy and national sovereignty and 
security concerns, continue to persist. Moreover, poor data sharing across the 
separate EU nations will continue to be an issue as ISIS cadres flee Syria and 
Iraq to return home.  Some of the same issues represent a barrier to U.S.-
European cooperation as well.10 
 
While the group’s geographic, military and political presence in Iraq and Syria 
continues to shrink, as indicated by intelligence analysts and government 
officials, its global ambitions, and psychological presence are likely to grow.11  
Battlefield setbacks are likely to cause a shift in the group’s strategy.  The 
terrorists are likely to take refuge in the rural areas and outskirts of Iraq and 
Syria, revert to mass casualty bombings, and establish operational and 
logistical sanctuaries with one of its regional affiliates in the Khorasan 
Province (Afghanistan or Pakistan), West Africa Province (Nigeria, Chad, 
Niger or Cameroon), or North Caucasus Province (Russia).  Southeast Asia 
has recently been added to the list as well.12  The group will also likely 
continue to expand its support base and intensify its attacks outside of Iraq 
and Syria.  In fact, the recent ISIS attacks in Turkey, Brussels, Paris, 
Bangladesh, and Germany serve as a testament to the shift in the group’s 
tactical strategy and long-term commitment to attack in the West.  Such 
newly created realities are what some refer to as the new normal.13  
                                                          
9 Archick, et al., “European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and 
Issues for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, April 27, 2015, available 
at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44003.pdf. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Carol Morello and Joby Warrick, “Islamic State’s Ambitions and Allure Grow as 




12 Krystal Chia and Lin Xeuling, “ISIS is Targeting Southeast Asia.” 
13 Carol Morello and Joby Warrick, “Islamic State’s Ambitions; “James J. Carafano, “‘New 
normal’ Has ISIS Popping All over the World, “Boston Herald, March 22, 2016, available 
at: 
http://www.bostonherald.com/opinion/op_ed/2016/03/carafano_new_normal_has_
isis_popping_up_around_globe; Ashish Kumar Sen, “ISIS Strikes Brussels: Is this the 
‘new normal’?” Atlantic Council, March 22, 2016, available at: 
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In our “ISIS Defectors Interview Project,” thirty-eight defectors and foreign 
fighters shared their horrific stories and experiences of living under the 
Islamic State and the ISIS-controlled territories.  These were individuals from 
Syria (32), the Balkans (4), and Western Europe (2).  Many of them had 
witnessed Muslim children as young as six-years-old manipulated into suicide 
bombings, massacres of Muslim dissenters, systematic rape of Muslim and 
Yazidi women as sex slaves, and the complete perversion of Islam.  As insiders 
to one of the most lethal terrorist organizations to date, these defectors 
represent the real and delusional ISIS and had much to say to denounce the 
group—statements which should be fully exploited to break the ISIS narrative 
and promotion of their so-called utopian Caliphate. 14 
 
Many of the interviewed defectors warned that if the group is defeated 
militarily in Syria and Iraq, their plan is to shave their beards, cut their hair, 
and blend into normal society in the local area and mount guerilla style urban 
attacks.  While we may welcome ISIS losing territory and its so-called state 
being destroyed, we must also recognize that fighting a militant army out in 
the open may be easier than fighting a veiled guerilla movement.  Recent 
events in Turkey, which appear to allow continued illicit and even openly 
proclaimed Islamic State activities in Turkey and the generous access that 
Syrian refugees have in Turkey, makes it quite possible that ISIS cadres and 
leaders could hide inside Turkey as well, if defeated in Syria and Iraq and 
continue terrorist operations from Turkey, basically unimpeded.  With the 
massive arrests and firings in the recent Turkish purge, Turkey has lost 
considerable expertise and experience in its counter-terrorism policing, 
intelligence, and judiciary services.15 
 
While many Islamic State foreign fighters have returned home and do not 
intend to go back, research indicated that there are others whose decision 
whether to stay or return is largely dependent on the extent to which they are 
welcomed back into society and if they see any future for themselves apart 
from ISIS.  Research also shows that many returnees still believe in the dream 
of so-called Caliphate, continue to share social and ideological bonds with 
those currently in Iraq and Syria, keep up communication with them, and 
many even profess a desire to return to the battlefield.  Some of them, in fact, 
                                                          
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/isis-strikes-brussels-is-this-the-
new-normal.  
14 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, ISIS Defectors, 332. 
15 Ahmet S. Yayla, “Turkey’s Failed Coup: A Victory for ISIS,” The Hill, July 20, 2016, 
available at: http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/288452-
turkeys-failed-coup-a-victory-for-isis. 




have already returned, while about others we can only wait and see.16  In light 
of such evidence, governments are likely to continue to face difficulties in 
responding to this new normal threat of many unknown, undetected by 
security services, or difficult to prosecute radicalized returnees who may be on 
the verge of causing harm at home or be travelers who engage in terrorist 
activities abroad.  Likewise, for those who are successfully prosecuted, 
European prison sentences tend to be short and many European prisons 
continue to be hotbeds of radicalization, which will likely not discourage 
continued ISIS involvement.  Between the United States and Europe, these 
factors may also pose risks in terms of the U.S. visa waiver system, which 
allows free visa entry to most Europeans, some of whom may harbor evil 
intent towards Americans. 
 
The new normal are also differences in policy perspectives among the parties 
affected on how to tackle the phenomenon of foreign fighters, as are the 
disagreements over the nature and the level of threat that foreign fighters may 
pose to their home countries.  One could also not help but notice how the 
growing online presence and support for terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, 
especially among the young, appear to have overwhelmed law enforcement’s 
ability to effectively monitor all extremist and violent activities, and in 
particular ISIS-related online activities, forcing them to focus only on those 
they perceive as the most severe security cases.17  Of course, as Michael 
Steinbach, Executive Assistant Director for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s National Security Branch, recently noted, the sheer volume of 
cases makes sorting through such cases a lot like trying to drink from a fire 
hose.  He added, the time from flash to bang decreased from months and 
years to weeks, making those that might slip through the cracks even more 
concerning.  Terrorist attacks, arrests, charges related to ISIS activities, and 
the fear of ISIS- inspired homegrown attacks from returnees all have become 
the new normal. 
 
In the actual theater of operations, depending on who wins the U.S. 
Presidency, the United States will be faced with the decision of whether or not 
to send in ground troops to fight ISIS.  Putting boots on the ground in Syria 
and Iraq, aside from those in Special Forces teams and advisory roles, is a 
decision most Americans do not support due to the previous costs and poor 
results in Iraq.  Likewise, any U.S. or Coalition-led occupation of Syria or Iraq 
                                                          
16 U.R., Y.D., D.K., R.B., M.S., B.I., A.K, Anne Speckhard, Ahmet S. Yayla, and Ardian 
Shajkovci, France, Turkey, and the Balkans, September 2014-June 2016.  
17 FBI officials, L.K., Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkovci, The Balkans and the United 
States, June 2015-September 2016.   
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will likely have blowback for the U.S. and Coalition troops, as well as Western 
interests in general.  Indeed, ISIS has long been goading Western troops into 
entering their territory as it plays into the group’s apocalyptic Us versus Them 
and End Times rhetoric and propaganda and would most certainly fuel new 
recruits—as it did during the previous Iraqi invasion for al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
Given that air strike withdrawal is not a viable option, the ideal formula for 
defeating the group would entail a clear political solution to the Syrian crisis, 
security restored to the local populations, a committed regional force ready to 
fight ISIS, and a clear vision of what will happen politically after the conflict 
ends.  Assad does not appear likely to step down, the Iranians and the 
Russians continue to support him, and many regional actors have conflicting 
stakes in the ultimate outcomes and in continuing to fuel subversively the 
battles.  The solution to the problem would be eased if we knew with certainty 
who our allies and our true adversaries are, and why those who we consider to 
be allies and are trained to fight hesitate to do so. Most importantly, little is 
known exactly what kind of enemy ISIS is, and will be, as it continues to lose 
its territory.  Terrorist groups constantly morph, as do alliances in the 
region—those openly stated as well as those occurring under the surface. 
 
After almost six years of investment with no clearly positive results or local 
partners who are reliable and able to institute any lasting peace in the region, 
the United States and its allies are clearly risk-averse—balancing unclear 
partnerships to the risks of allowing the conflicts to continue.  Knowing that 
they cannot reliably influence inter-group rivalries, internal conflicts, 
sectarian violence, and regional rivalries, nor secure a larger political space 
and mandate at home to fight ISIS, the new normal appears to entail engaging 
in partnerships of convenience and admitting that arming anyone may result 
in later facing those same arms in the hands of enemy combatants.  For the 
Europeans and the United States, avoiding further on the ground military 
involvement in the region may not be a viable option to containing ISIS so 
that the group does not threaten its citizens at home and interests in the 
Middle East, but the struggle for what might work continues unabated.  For 
the Arab States, preventing Iranian dominance and growth in the region is 
crucial.  Proxy warfare and funding of militias by the Gulf States and Iran 
continues to fuel the sectarian divide that al-Qaeda in Iraq lead by Abu Musab 
Zarqawi exploded wide open.  For Russia and Iran, keeping Assad in power is 
important, while Iran also struggles to maintain a good relationship with the 
United States.  For Turkey, ignoring ISIS, and even cooperating to fight 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime and restraining the Kurds, may play best to their 




own political and security interests—at least for the time being as Erdogan 
continues to solidify his power inside Turkey.18  
 
Conclusion 
The loss of significant swaths of territories by ISIS and the considerable drop 
in the number of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria are likely to continue to 
weaken the group’s recruitment efforts.  The former is especially important 
given that ISIS also relies on recruits—even children forcibly conscripted—
from the territories it controls.19  Such interpretations may be misleading, 
however, primarily because they discount the high rate at which ISIS 
continues to replenish itself despite its losses.  While killing ISIS’ leaders is an 
important aspect of the fight against ISIS, the past research on terrorist 
assassinations shows that killing terrorist leadership may not always 
represent a winning strategy—it does not work well if they can quickly replace 
charismatic and battlefield leadership, explosives expertise, and so forth. 20  
 
ISIS continues to control large swaths of territories in Iraq and Syria, which it 
will unlikely lose access to altogether. The fact that its leaders are usually 
killed in the communities that provide support to them and that atrocities 
continue to be carried out by the enemies of ISIS as well, it may be that the 
group will continue to generate a steady stream of recruits and leaders in the 
areas in which it operates.  Likewise, failure to resolve the political and 
security issues in Iraq and Syria that gave rise and strong support to ISIS will 
continue to give fertile ground to its return.21  Already complaints have been 
                                                          
18 Ahmet S. Yayla and Anne Speckhard, “Aftermath of Another ISIS Attack in Gaziantep, 
Turkey: A Possible New Internal Conflict for Turkey, “International Center for the Study 
of Violent Extremism, August 22, 2016, available at: http://www.icsve.org/brief-
reports/aftermath-of-another-isis-attack-in-gaziantep-turkey-a-possible-new-internal-
conflict-for-turkey/; Ahmet S. Yayla and Anne Speckhard, “Playing with Fire: Erdogan’s 
Anti-U.S. Scheme,” World Policy Blog, July 27, 2016, available at: 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/07/27/playing-fire-erdo%C4%9Fans-anti-us-
scheme. 
19 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, ISIS Defectors, 332. 
20 Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A 
Multivariate Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic during the Al-Aqsa Uprisings,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:4 (2006): 359-82. 
21 Max Fisher, “Does Killing Terrorist Leaders Make any Difference? Scholars Are 
Doubtful,” The New York Times, August 30, 2016, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/middleeast/syria-killing-terrorist-
leaders.html?_r=1. 
Speckhard, Ph.D. et al.: Defeating ISIS on the Battle Ground
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
8 
made by Sunnis in the liberated areas of Iraq of disappearances, revenge 
killings, and rapes by Shia militias.  22  
 
Political grievances in the region that gave rise to al-Qaeda in Iraq and then to 
ISIS continue to exist without good solutions.  After years of sectarian 
violence, the scars from torture, rape, or bombings will not be easily healed, 
nor trust easily restored.  Moreover, the apparently stupendous draw of 
thirty-eight thousand foreign fighters and unabated recruitment to a brutal 
terrorist group and grueling battlefield is a glaring statement in itself about 
the social, psychological, and political grievances in the countries from which 
these ISIS foreign fighters come.  First and second-generation Muslim 
immigrants continue to find life difficult due to lack of social integration and 
as marginalization and discrimination continue to create serious obstacles to 
their success in Western Europe.  Corruption, oppressive regimes, bad 
governance, and high unemployment in many other parts of the world 
continue to fuel belief in the ISIS Caliphate and a willingness to fight for it.   
 
Likewise, Western support to oppressive and corrupt regimes, as well as 
counter-terrorism actions including drone kills and bombings that also kill 
civilians, remain festering grievances that fuel ISIS recruitment.  As long as 
significant groups vulnerable to ISIS recruitment continue to believe the 
governments they live under will not serve them and do not see their futures 
bright without the promises of the so-called Caliphate, they may continue to 
fuel the ISIS dream of an alternative world order that falsely promises to 
deliver to them dignity, purpose, significance and justice.   
 
Thus, despite apparent differences in legal and policy approaches and 
perspectives on the foreign fighter threat, foreign fighters will remain an 
important aspect of ISIS’s strategy and recruitment campaign, or if ISIS is 
defeated entirely, give rise to follow-on terrorist movements that speak to the 
same sets of grievances among these ISIS recruits.  In this regard, efforts 
should be made to understand foreign fighter motivations and grievances, 
whether they be real or perceived.  
 
As indicated above, ISIS narratives and propaganda on the Internet and social 
media also represent a significant challenge in the fight against ISIS.  
Research shows that governments lack adequate policy and legal frameworks 
on how to incorporate effectively the narratives of those who have disengaged 
                                                          
22 An International aid worker in Iraq speaking to locals in liberated areas, Anne 
Speckhard, Amman, Jordan, November 1, 2016.  M.M. L., Anne Speckhard, Amman, 
Jordan, November 13, 2016.  




from ISIS into their counter-narrative messaging efforts, meaning much more 
emphasis is placed on criminalizing actions and little is being done to find 
viable ways to incorporate both 
 
In addition, in the digital battlefield, government efforts are mostly focused 
on removing ISIS propaganda and content that is present online, which in 
and of itself is problematic considering the amount of the new material that is 
being added by the group on a daily basis to social networking sites.  Likewise, 
governments have for the most part mounted anti-terrorist campaigns that 
are limited to rational and logical arguments, while ISIS (and al-Qaeda before 
ISIS) are using visuals and emotional arguments to secure its following.  
Without employing the same type of Madison Avenue emotional marketing 
appeal to vulnerable populations, we cannot hope to win against Islamic 
State’s global online appeals.  
 
ISIS also casts a wide net, then checks to see who is responding with 
“retweets,” “likes” and other endorsements of their online materials.  When 
they see endorsements they swarm in and, at least in the initial stages, meet 
the needs of their potential recruits while seducing them further into the 
group—and to their ultimate destruction.  This points to the need to match 
ISIS’ online outreach methods, specifically by using graphically visual and 
emotionally compelling materials and standing up city-wide helplines and 
rapid intervention teams to actually reach out to vulnerable persons who are 
entering or are already on the terrorist trajectory.  Often, security forces know 
who these individuals and their family members are, but without employing 
equally effective swarming methods as ISIS uses the prospect for victory will 
remain farfetched.  There is a need to become as adept at pulling potential 
joiners back off the terrorist trajectory and preventing entry all together, and 
to otherwise meet their needs and redirect their passions for justice and social 
change into nonviolent means—or else ISIS will continue to win, as they have 
been, in the online space. 
 
Given the scale of the group’s online presence and propaganda, and their 
arguably to date unchallenged power to entice many recruits worldwide, the 
focus should remain on delivering a proportional blow to ISIS online 
propaganda machinery.  Our recent fieldwork research experience indicates 
that this can be done both by empowering important and credible voices 
within ISIS and by encouraging governments worldwide to reevaluate their 
current legal barriers that prevent many defectors from coming forward with 
their stories, all in an effort to increase the impact of counter-narrative 
messaging. Arguably, soft power approaches often cost less than one 
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Tomahawk missile hurled into the battle space, and they work with little to no 
collateral damage to fuel even more terrorist activity.  The new normal needs 
to incorporate not only defeating ISIS on the battleground, but also its digital 
Caliphate in the online battle space. 23 
 
                                                          
23 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, ISIS Defectors, 332; Anne Speckhard, “The Best 
Weapon”; Anne Speckhard, “How Do We Defeat ISIS?  Less Bombs More Social,” The 
Hill, July 6, 2016, available at: http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-
affairs/286476-how-do-we-defeat-isis-less-bombs-more-social; Authors stress that this 
could be done, as evidenced in recent interviews that captured on video dozens of ISIS 
defectors willing to speak out against the group, as well as efforts to produce their 
materials into captivating short video clips that appear as ISIS materials until one 
actually interacts with them to hear former ISIS cadres denounce the group.  Example 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCumpEsozixbl-PyKw12hmnw. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss4/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.4.1560
